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Prolegomena to the Method and Culture of Comparative Law 
 
 
Maurice Adams and Dirk Heirbaut 
 
 
I. Setting the Scene 
 
In May 2014, Mark Van Hoecke will retire from his Research Chair of Legal Theory and 
Comparative Law at Ghent University in Belgium. Those who know him will realize that a 
purely celebratory Festschrift, followed by the traditional practice of some festivity for 
handing it over, would be out of the question; for Mark Van Hoecke, legal science is about 
content, not form. So, to ‘mark’ the occasion, we have chosen another formula: a publication 
on a theme that has occupied his thinking over the last two decades or so, and which is of ever 
growing importance to academic lawyers all over the world. 
Throughout his academic career, including the years as a university administrator, 
Mark Van Hoecke has been interested in many legally relevant topics, but legal theory, 
comparative law, and method and methodology of law stand out.1 This volume brings 
together several authors working at the crossroads of these themes: the method(ology) and 
culture of comparative law. 
Mark Van Hoecke has, from the start of his career in the 1970s, been a scholar with a 
truly international outlook. It is nevertheless fair to say that this volume continues an 
intellectual voyage that began somewhat later with a publication (with Francois Ost) that 
advocated, already in 1990 (!), a truly European legal education.2 Comparative law was, of 
course, part and parcel of that. Legal education had to change from a merely local approach to 
a more integrated one, ie one that could make more sense of legal diversity and that put 
perspective - possibly subversive perspective3 - onto national law, or which called this 
national law into question.4 This was a plea for a comparative law, broadly defined. Today, 
                                                          
1 As a university administrator he has successively and successfully been Dean and Rector Magnificus of the 
(then) Catholic University of Brussels, infusing into the curriculum of its Law School international and 
transboundary elements. He has also, significantly, established with Francois Ost the European Academy of 
Legal Theory, which offers a Master Degree in Legal Theory (which from 2014/15 onwards will be hosted at the 
Goethe-University in Frankfurt/Main), and with which Mark is still much involved. See: www.legaltheory.net 
2 F Ost and M Van Hoecke, ‘Naar een Europese rechtsopleiding’ (1989-90) Rechtskundig Weekblad 1001. The 
article was a real early bird, and has been translated in Danish (‘Pa vej mod en faelles euopaeisk jurisdisk 
uddannelse’ (1991) Ugeskrift for Retsvaesen 161), German (‘Für eine europäische Juristenausbildung’ (1990) 
Juristenzeitung 911), French (‘Pour une formation juridique européenne’ (1990) Journal des Tribunaux 105), 
and Italian (‘Per una formazione giuridica europea’ (1990) Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto Publico 629). 
3 G Fletcher, ‘Comparative Law as a Subversive Discipline’ (1998) 46 The American Journal of Comparative 
Law 683; H Muir Watt, ‘La fonction subversive du droit comparé’ (2000) 52 Revue internationale de droit 
comparé 503. 
4 Interesting later proposals and ideas can be found in C Valcke, ‘Global Law Teaching’ (2004) 54 Journal of 
Legal Education 160; M Reimann, ‘From the Law of Nations to Transnational Law: Why We Need a New Basic 
Course for the International Curriculum’ (2004) 22 Penn State International Law Review 397; J Husa, ‘Turning 
the Curriculum Upside Down’ (2009) 10 German Law Journal 913, and S Chesterman, ‘The Evolution of Legal 
Education: Internationalization, Transnationalization, Globalization’ (2009) 10 German Law Journal 877-888. 
See also the Global Law Issue of the Tilburg Law Review (Volume 17/2, 2012 (edited by S Musa and E de 
Volder, with quite some attention for the educational dimension of globalization). 
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we are still struggling to bring such an approach into the regular law school curriculum. 
The just mentioned short, but seminal piece was followed up with several articles and 
books, written or (co-)edited, on comparative law and legal research, some of which have 
become classics in this domain. To mention but a few: ‘Hohfeld and Comparative Law’5, 
‘Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards a New Model for 
Comparative Law’6; ‘Western and Non-Western Legal Cultures’7; The Harmonization of 
European Private Law8, Law as Communication9; ‘Legal Orders between Autonomy and 
Intertwinement’10; Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law11; ‘Deep Level 
Comparative Law’12; ‘European Legal Cultures in a Context of Globalisation’13; ‘Islamic 
Jurisprudence and Western Legal History’14; Methodologies of Legal Research. Which Kind 
of Research for What Kind of Discipline15; ‘Family Law Transfers from Europe to Africa: 
Lessons for the Methodology of Comparative Legal Research’16; ‘Do “Legal Systems” Exist? 
The Concept of Law and Comparative Law’17; ‘Legal Culture and Legal Transplants’18 and 
‘Methodology of Comparative Legal Research’19. 
Many others of Mark’s publications could have been listed20, but the ones mentioned 
seem to be the most directly relevant to the theme of this volume. The ability to contribute to 
this theme lay foremost in our selection of contributors. What counted was not just friendship 
to the colleague we wanted to honor (albeit that too was certainly applicable to quite a number 
of the contributors), but especially amity to the academic endeavor Mark stood for and 
continues to stand for, thus contributing to the further development of the academic debate we 
all hold dear. 
 
 
II. Method and Culture: Approach and Object 
 
In each of the aforementioned publications, Mark Van Hoecke’s professional interest and 
                                                          
5 In (1996) 9 International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 185. 
6 In (1998) 47 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 495 (with M. Warrington). 
7 In W Krawietz and C Varga (eds), On Different Legal Cultures, Premodern and Modern States, and the 
Transition to the Rule of Law in Western and Eastern Europe (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, Sondernheft 
Rechtstheorie, 2002) 197. 
8 Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2000 (edited volume, with F Ost). 
9 Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2002. 
10 In KH Ladeur (ed), Public Governance in the Age of Globalization (Farnham, Ashgate, 2004) 177. 
11 Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2004 (edited volume). 
12 In M Van Hoecke (ed), Epistemology and Methodology of Comparative Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing 2004) 
165. 
13 In T Gizbert-Studnicki and J Stelmach (ed), Law and Legal Cultures in the 21st Century (Plenary Lectures for 
the 23rd IVR World Congress, Diversity and Unity : Plenary Lectures) (Warszawa, Wolters Kluwer, 2007) 81. 
14 In JS Nielsen and L Christoffersen (eds), Shariʾa as Discourse: Legal Traditions and the Encounter with 
Europe (Farnham, Ashgate, 2010) 45. 
15 Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2011 (edited volume). 
16 In J Gillespie and P Nicholson (eds), Law and Development and the Global Discourses of Legal Transfers 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012) 279. 
17 In S Donlan and L Heckendorn (eds), Concepts of Law: Comparative, Jurisprudential, and Social Science 
Perspectives (Farnham, Ashgate, 2014), forthcoming. 
18 Forthcoming. 
19 Forthcoming. 




research focus are combined: he always writes about comparative law from the angle of 
method and methodology. This observation invites for some elaboration about the title of this 
volume: The Method and Culture of Comparative Law. 
The word ‘culture’ in the title might denote at least two meanings here: it might, on 
the one hand, refer to one of the natural objects of comparison, ie legal cultures, where the 
identifying elements of such cultures range from ‘facts about institutions’ to ‘various forms of 
behavior’, or ‘more nebulous aspects of ideas, values, aspirations and mentalities.’21 On the 
other hand, it might also refer to what researching this implies or entails in terms of the 
research approach – ie the method and methodology22 - when dealing with legal cultures, 
whether they are national or transnational, which, at least at first instance, are strange to the 
researcher. In other words, the title of this volume also refers to the culture of actually doing 
comparative legal research, something that is also prevalent in most if not all of Van Hoecke’s 
work in comparative law. 
These two meanings of the word culture cannot, in this context, be neatly separated. 
The reason for this is that an ‘involved’ activity like doing comparative law, precisely because 
it deals significantly with legal cultures, does not come naturally to a researcher. Comparative 
lawyers have to find a way with, and convey information about, legal cultures or traditions 
whose ‘language’ (metaphorically understood) they do not necessarily speak; cultures and 
traditions with specific institutions and unexpressed codes; with their own history, ideology or 
ideologies and self-image(s); cultures the researcher has not normally been trained, educated 
or disciplined in and with which (s)he is therefore not naturally or intimately connected.23 The 
process of trying to understand this ‘otherness’24 (or some of its elements), and the task to 
convey its intricacies to the reader, demands a particular - ‘deep level’25 - research approach 
that goes far beyond mere fact-finding and the regular (ie purely national) self-evident way of 
interpreting and understanding the law. Therefore, comparative law explicitly calls for using a 
research methodology that makes it possible to engage in the cultural context of the topic or 
issue that is being studied, and do so in a way that is comprehensible to the reader.26 Seen 
from this point of view, the phrases ‘Method’ and ‘Culture’ in the title of this volume do, even 
in their multiple meanings, refer to each other. 
 
                                                          
21 D Nelken, ‘Defining and Using the Concept of Legal Culture’ in E Örücü and D Nelken (ed), Comparative 
Law. A Handbook (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2006) 113 (including an excellent treatment of the methodological 
problems and questions that come with employing a concept, in the context of comparative legal research, like 
legal culture). Highly critical about the concept of legal culture is R Cotterrell, ‘Comparatists and Sociology’ 
in P Legrand and R Munday (eds) Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) 149; R Cotterrell, ‘The Concept of Legal Culture’ in D Nelken (ed) 
Comparing Legal Cultures (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1997) 33, and R Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society. Legal 
Ideas in the Mirror of Social Theory (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006). 
22 A word of caution is in place here because, as Hage notes in his contribution to this volume, the terms 
‘method’ and ‘methodology’, although conceptually separable, are many times conflated. On this, see also the 
next section of this chapter. 
23 In a similar vein, also Ost in this volume. 
24 See too Millns in her contribution to this volume. 
25 Van Hoecke, ‘Deep Level Comparative Law’. 
26 On this J Bell, ‘Legal Research and the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law’ in M Van Hoecke (ed), 
Methodologies of Legal Research 155, and M de S-O-l’E Lasser, ‘The Question of Understanding’ in P Legrand 
and R Munday (eds), Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge, Cambridge University 




III. Three Main Topics 
 
In line with this general theme, the contributions to this volume might be categorized into: a) 
method and methodology, b) globalization (or Europeanization, internationalization), and c) 
context and interdisciplinarity. However, even if many of the chapters have a focus on one of 
these topics or categories, most, if not all, also consist of important elements evident in the 
other categories. Therefore, we have chosen not to make this categorization explicitly visible 
in the Table of Contents; this could detract the reader from valuable and interesting aspects of 
chapters that do not at first sight fall into the category that seems most relevant for their 
purpose. Nonetheless, it makes sense here to dwell a bit on each of these categories (and its 
chapters mentioned in this introduction), thereby cross-referencing to the other less obvious, 
yet relevant ones. 
 
A Method and Methodology 
Academic lawyers today face one of the greatest challenges ever. For centuries they have 
continued to work in the same way. If a medieval law professor were to be revived and to 
teach and do research in a contemporary law school, he would probably not find it that hard to 
adapt.27 True, instead of Latin, today’s law professors speak in a vernacular, they moreover 
use computers and projectors, and more than half of their audiences are young women. 
However, all of these changes have not affected what is by many still perceived to be the 
essence of legal education and research, ie to work in line with what Geoffrey Samuel in his 
contribution to this volume calls the authority paradigm. This is the idea that practitioners and 
academics working within the legal discipline are governed ultimately not by enquiry – the 
results of which in the end may force those working within the paradigm to abandon their 
theories in the face of empirical reality – but by textual authority as expressed in statutes and 
court decisions (rules); texts, moreover, whose authority as such is never put into question. A 
revived Bartolus would possibly have some catching up to do, but he most probably could 
function adequately with the method he had already mastered: textual interpretation. 
The situation is completely different in other sciences. One cannot imagine a medieval 
medical doctor to be as well prepared for our times. For that the disciplines that make up the 
medical and natural sciences have seen too many paradigm shifts. This is also true of the 
much younger social sciences. In any case, this has led to a situation of, save some 
exceptions, profound methodological unawareness among academic lawyers. As a result, both 
method and methodology of law are still in their infancy. 
Samuel, in his chapter, makes clear that a comparative lawyer may encounter many 
questions, which are at heart epistemological (what is meant by comparison? what is meant by 
‘law’? what is it to have knowledge of law?), making epistemology and comparative 
methodology conjoined twins. In exploring their link, Samuel enunciates some ideas that are 
relevant for any comparatist. Legal epistemology, just like comparative law, is concerned with 
similarity and difference and it operates in a context with different ‘knowledges’ of law, 
rooted in the work of theorists and in the ideas of practicing lawyers. To understand them we 
                                                          
27 See in a similar vein also Samuel in this volume. 
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have to understand their past and to really comprehend them we have to learn from the 
epistemology of other sciences, which can boast a considerable literature. Doing this is quite a 
challenge, but Samuel also shows a glimpse of what we could achieve, ie an ‘escape, from the 
arid past of comparative law, from legal positivism and, above all, from the authority 
paradigm.’ Ultimately, Samuel’s contribution might be understood as a plea for 
interdisciplinarity and external perspectives in legal research. Comparative law, if it is 
prepared to leave the authority paradigm and its accompanying focus on rules, can indeed be 
of particular value here, especially if it is to serve as a tool that brings to the fore 
epistemological issues concerning the technique of comparison, the description of law (ie 
what is meant by it) and the ‘objectivity’ of facts.28 
This invites for an interesting observation, because what is also at play here, so it 
seems to us, is that the comparatist’s understanding of what law is, is not simply one question 
among others within a comparative method, but relates to a set of background assumptions 
and conceptions that inform nearly everything comparative lawyers do.29 If it is indeed true 
that theories of law play such an important (albeit many times implicit) role in comparative 
projects - ie that views on what law is, means and does, and on what is interesting about what 
law is, means and does, inform methodological choices on all levels of the comparative 
exercise - then it is possible that at least some of the prevalent unease about comparative 
method may have to be traced back to unease or disagreement about these underlying 
theories.30 
Hage makes a sharp distinction between method and methodology of comparative law 
and legal research. The former referring to the actual way(s) of conducting a more or less 
specific research project (and also to the standards by which the relevance of arguments found 
in specific research can be evaluated), whilst the other is mainly of an epistemological nature. 
He asks two questions: is comparative law a method for legal research as such, and does it 
have a proper method of its own? The first can be answered positively, as Hage shows (eg by 
using examples in the realm of harmonizing European private law): comparative law can be 
of benefit for evaluating potential or actual rules of law, or explaining its content. In 
answering the second question, Hage formulates what may well be seen as the common creed 
of the authors in this volume, and which we readily confirm: there is no royal road to 
comparative law! 
Indeed, trying to find a method for comparative law in the abstract, not connected to 
some kind of concrete question is like chasing a will-o’-the-wisp: trying to find a method for 
something that is not a question – such as ‘comparative law’ – is not of any service. 
Comparative law is a collection of methods that may be helpful in seeking answers to an 
                                                          
28 Van Hoecke, ‘Deep Level Comparative Law’ 
29 In many a chapter in this volume this point is being made implicitly or explicitly. See, eg, Brownsword, 
Donlan, Samuel. On this, too, see M Adams and JA Bomhoff, ‘Comparing Law: Practice and Theory’, in M 
Adams and JA Bomhoff (eds), Practice and Theory in Comparative Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 2012) 8. 
30 A conclusion that in turn should temper hopes that the key to sounder comparative law methodology can be 
found exclusively in developing better understandings of the logical operations involved in the ‘act of 
comparing’ (cf M Reimann, ‘The Progress and Failure of Comparative Law in the Second Half of the Twentieth 
Century’ (2002) 50 American Journal of Comparative Law 690). 
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almost endless variety of questions about law (broadly defined).31 Thus, diversity in method is 
not a curse, but a blessing, because it allows a researcher to choose the methods that fit their 
data, research questions and personal inclinations. 
Turning away, for now, from the most fundamental theoretical questions, a second set 
of questions is in need of an answer: what actually is method in comparative law? How to 
actually conduct comparative legal research? Jaakko Husa makes clear that as the goal(s) of 
the comparative lawyer is (are) mostly different from that of other scientists, so, too, is his 
method different from the method of other sciences. Husa identifies a selection of basic 
research-designs for comparison, which have to be made before the research starts or during 
it. Comparative law is from a methodological point of view mainly heuristic, Husa concludes. 
But as a result of the constant and intertwining choices either of a technical or a theoretical 
nature, the specific methods (or combination thereof) a researcher will use, can differ. 
Reading Husa’s article will help many fellow travelers to see more clearly the paths opening 
up for them and the need of enunciating their choices, which constantly evolve and will be 
revised as the investigation unfolds.32 
Comparison has many faces and this book tries to present some of them. In this, 
comparison is like translation, which is also the subject of François Ost’s contribution. The 
‘penetration of the external by the internal’ (European and public international law, private 
international law, bilingual legal systems), means that no lawyer can escape from comparison 
and translation. Translation (and comparison) would also occur, and to a certain extent is 
inevitable, in the situation of a completely isolated, pristine legal system, as jurists would still 
look to the past, and would also look at one branch of law from the perspective of another. 
Jurists would therefore benefit from the practice of translation theory, most of all because 
translation, like comparison, is not limited. It includes more than just words in one language 
being placed in, or translated, into another33, it is also translating different legal cultures. The 
difficulty that translation thus brings, implies ethical responsibility: it is always accompanied 
by the task of recognition of the difference of the ‘other’, and of the wish to undertake with 
him an interaction on the basis of the reciprocal admission of the limits of each other's own 
language. 
Maurice Adams elaborates on this topic, and also upon a point explicitly made by 
Valcke and Grellette (see below): attaching labels to unfamiliar notions (including elements 
of foreign legal cultures) can do as much harm as good. They may point the researcher in the 
right direction, but just as much make him stray from the right path. The researcher is in any 
case not neutral when he or she applies a label by which it becomes possible to actually 
compare at least two legal cultures. Confronted with the challenge of comparing legal 
cultures, one can decide to come up with a completely independent signifier (a ‘language 
without a national home’), or one can apply more broadly known existing labels (such as ones 
from Roman or English law). A pragmatist would possibly plead for the last alternative, as it 
                                                          
31 Also M Adams and J Griffiths, ‘Against ‘Comparative Method’: Explaining Similarities and Differences’ in M 
Adams and JA Bomhoff (ed), Practice and Theory in Comparative Law 279. 
32 About this last point, see also Adams, and Valcke and Grellette in this volume. 
33 But see also Millns in this volume, who advises that one should avoid literal translation as much as possible in 
the context of comparative law, because it might result in a poor understanding of the other legal culture. 
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would make his or her work more accessible than using a narrative that is neutral to any legal 
system or culture. 
Whatever the choice may be, any translation involves a kind of treason towards the 
original concept. At worst, it leads to deception of the reader and even a displacement of the 
original concept that one wants to compare, especially if its legal culture does not have a 
strong enough voice of its own. Adams proposes a way out of this dilemma. Admitting that 
complete neutrality is a holy grail, which one can quest for, but never find, he defends 
controlled comparison: one can use the terminology of an existing system, but a comparatist 
should constantly work in a ‘spirit of conceptual tentativeness’. The researcher can start with 
familiar existing terms, but should be aware of their limitations and constantly revise them in 
light of the evolving research and growing insight.34 As the researcher grows into the subject, 
the terms of comparison should be changed for ones that fit better the research project at 
hand.35 
Ideas of functionality and of functional equivalence (still) play a prominent role in 
contemporary comparative scholarship. This may come as something of a surprise given the 
fact that critical scholarship has long taken issue with views of comparative law as the 
comparison of ‘solutions’ to ‘problems’ that are supposedly clearly identifiable and more or 
less identical across systems.36 But it seems that, to some degree at least, while critical 
theoretical writing on comparative law often consists of broad-based attacks on functionalist 
premises – especially in the form voiced by Zweigert and Kötz37 – many practical efforts at 
comparison are instead concerned with incrementally refining and supplementing 
functionalist ideas, and with navigating creatively functionalism’s acknowledged limitations. 
Given the central place functionalism occupies in comparative law, Catherine Valcke 
and Matthew Grellette have put it under their microscope. Their analysis of the propositions 
                                                          
34 A similar conclusion (ie comparison is never neutral, but the tendency to measure jurisdictions by one’s own 
familiar standards can be somewhat mitigated) is reached by Millns in her contribution. 
35 According to Karl Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (London, Hutchison, 1972) 31-2, the scientific 
process is such that the starting point may be constantly revisited as the investigation unfolds. See also Valcke 
and Grellette in this volume. 
36 In the social sciences, ‘functionalism’ generally refers (whether or not explicitly and consciously) to the idea 
that ‘the consequences of some behavior or social arrangement are essential elements of the causes of that 
behavior’ (see AL Stinchcombe, Constructing Social Theories (New York, Harcourt, Brace & World, 1968) 80, 
for a still careful analysis and discussion of the circumstances in which a functional explanation may be 
appropriate). 
37 K Zweigert and H Kötz, An Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1998) 34ff. 
Glendon et al not only state that the principle of functionality in comparative law is now recognized to have wide 
applicability, but also that it is ‘probably comparative law’s principal gift to twentieth century legal science’. 
MA Glendon, MW Gordon and PG Carozza, Comparative Legal Traditions (in a Nutshell) (St Paul, West 
Group, 1999) 9. The first full-scale criticism of this sort of functionalism in comparative law is G Frankenberg, 
‘Critical Comparisons: Re-Thinking Comparative Law’ (1985) 26 Harvard International Law Journal 411. See, 
too: P Legrand, Fragments on Law-as-Culture (Deventer, Tjeenk Willink, 1999), and R Hyland, ‘Comparative 
Law’ in D Patterson (ed), A Companion to the Philosophy of Law and Legal Theory (Cambridge, Blackwell, 
1996) 184. For a critical overview article, see M Graziadei, ‘The Functionalist Heritage’, in P Legrand and R 
Munday (eds), Comparative Legal Studies: Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2004) 100, and R Michaels, ‘The Functional Method of Comparative Law’, in M Reimann and R Zimmermann 
(eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), 381. For important 
qualifications, see J Husa, ‘Farewell to Functionalism or Methodological Tolerance?’ (2003) 67 Rabels 
Zeitschrift für ausländisches und internationales Privatrecht 419, and J De Coninck, ‘The Functional Method of 




behind the functionalism of Zweigert and Kötz should be obligatory literature for any 
functionalist researcher. The same holds for their analysis of the critics of Zweigert and 
Kötz’s functionalism. Valcke and Grellette are also critics, though of the best kind. They 
show the weak points, but not to demolish the comparative legal building. Instead, they 
propose an amended model, a kind of functionality 2.0 as it were, thus bringing the work of 
both Zweigert and Kötz and the latters’ critics to a synthesis. First of all, for identifying 
materials for a comparison, legal labels can be misleading to the extreme. Using legal 
functions for identification ensures that the researcher does not compare quite different 
phenomena. Function is, according to them, also useful for analyzing the materials selected, 
as a functionalist comparison aiming at the actual operation of the law would give more 
visibility to legal formants, which have hitherto been less visible. Putting two systems side by 
side would inevitably lead to some previously obscured formants coming out of the 
woodwork. 
Like thinking about method and methodology of comparative law, thinking about the 
method and methodology of comparative legal history is still in its infancy.38 Some 
comparative legal historians, like Matt Dyson, have focused on what they can learn from 
comparative law.39 Martin Löhnig, in his contribution, goes the other way, since he moves 
beyond historical comparative law that compares legal concepts. Instead, he argues for 
attention to the social processes of transformation behind these concepts. Even traditional 
national legal history is now no longer possible without comparison. Comparison can help to 
fill in gaps if not enough historical sources are available. It can help to go from an isolated 
empirical result to a more general theory, or to test a theory based on limited research, eg for 
one country. In short, the methodology of comparative legal history can learn from 
comparative law, but it also has something to offer in return, which might well explain the 
relatively high number of contributions from comparative law’s sister discipline in this book. 
 
B. Globalization 
H. Patrick Glenn has aptly and repeatedly observed that for a long time comparative law and 
comparative legal scholarship have generally been marked by constructivist purposes: as a 
means for state building and local law reform.40 In this sense, comparative law lent support to 
the idea of law being an exclusively national phenomenon: an instrument in the 
nationalization of the law. Looking at the region where the editors of this volume come from, 
ie continental Europe, up until the nineteenth century, when the nation state was in formation 
                                                          
38 See, eg, the special 2013 issue of Rechtskultur on methodology, or A Musson and Ch Stebbings, Making Legal 
History: Approaches and Methodologies (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
39 See, eg, M Dyson, ‘Divide and Conquer: Using Legal Domains in Comparative Legal Studies’, in G 
Helleringer and K Purnhagen, Towards a European legal culture (forthcoming). 
40 See, albeit in passing, Glenn’s contribution to this volume. But see also HP Glenn, ‘The Nationalist Heritage’, 
in P Legrand and R Munday (eds), Comparative Legal Studies Traditions and Transitions (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2003) 76-99 and HP Glenn, ‘A Transnational Concept of Law’ in P Cane and M 
Tushnet (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003) 839-862. In what 
has arguably for a long time been the most influential handbook of the discipline, this constructivist approach is 
very much promoted: K Zweigert and H Kötz, Introduction to Comparative Law (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 1998): ‘In its applied version, comparative law suggests how a specific problem can most appropriately be 
solved under the given social and economic circumstances. (p. 11; similar statements can be found throughout 
the introductory and methodological chapters of the book). See also M Adams, ‘Comparative Law in a 
Globalizing World: Three Challenges’ (2013) 17 Tilburg Law Review 263 (on which this section is partly based). 
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for some time already41, there were quite some legal sources available which interacted or 
competed with each other for prominence: eg canon law, local statutes, custom, case law, 
Roman law (the overarching and unifying source), and, yes, the Bible (the latter the most 
´binding´ of all!). It was more specifically the ideal of codification - prominently entering the 
legal scene in the wake of the French revolution42 - which demanded to put an end to this 
situation: law was identified exclusively with written and national law.43 National codified law 
was on the one hand to be the exclusive source of law, identifiable through a local Grundnorm or 
rule of recognition44, and, on the other hand, was to contain the solution for about every situation 
conceivable (law’s adequacy).45 As a result, legislative positivism became the ideal, and 
systemic closeness the result. So, although paradoxically, the content of national law was the 
result of the mining of comparative sources46, extra-national inspiration was not really a 
necessity anymore once the funnel of codification had been applied to it. National law was 
thought to be self-supporting, and the legal system was predominantly understood as an entity 
in which ‘demos’, law creation and a specifically delineated area were intimately bound.47 
Since the nineteenth century it was: La Nation, la loi, (and possibly) le roi - in that order. As a 
result, comparative law ‘withered’ in the margin, both in terms of the law school’s curriculum 
and in terms of research48; an intellectual pastime if ever there was one. 
In recent years comparative law has witnessed a revival, especially as a result of 
globalization, which Twining loosely describes as the developments and interactions which 
are making the world more interdependent with respect to ecology, economy, 
                                                          
41 The rise of the nation state is of course a complex, dialectic development. Usually one is referred to the Peace 
of Westphalia (1648) as the starting point, although the concept of the state as such has developed from the 
thirteenth century onwards. For nuance and details we refer to M van Creveld, The Rise and Decline of the State 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999) and H Spruyt, The Sovereign State and its Competitors: an 
Analysis of Systems Change (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1994). On the term state and its use, see A 
Guéry, ‘The State. The Tool of Common Good’ in P Nora (ed), Rethinking France. Les lieux de mémoire, I, 
(Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2001) 1. 
42 Just as the concept of the nation state, the concept of codification has older roots than the French Revolution and 
Napoleon (with whom it is generally associated). For nuance and details, see, inter alia, J Vanderlinden, Le concept 
de code en Europe occidental (Brussels, ULB Editions de l’Institut de sociologie, 1967); F Wieacker, A History of 
Private Law in Europe with Particular Reference to Germany (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995), and P van den 
Berg, The Politics of European Codification. A History of the Unification of Law in France, Prussia, the 
Austrian Monarchy and the Netherlands (Groningen, Europa Law Publishing) 2006. 
43 It even suffered, as Gény said, from a ‘fétichisme de la loi écrite codifiée.’ F. Gény Méthode d’interprétation et 
sources en droit privé positif: essai critique, I (Paris, Librairie Génerale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1919) 70. 
44 These terms of course come from H Kelsen and HLA Hart respectively. On the neglect of Hart of comparative 
legal scholarship see the (posthumously published) monograph by AWB Simpson, Reflections on ‘The Concept 
of Law’, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011, 157ff. The universalistic aspirations of his concept of law did 
not seem to really invite Hart for comparative observations. It could and should have, though. 
45 However, the reality fell far from the ideal of a code without gaps excluding all other legal sources (see, eg, G 
Weiss, ‘The Enchantment of Codification in the Common Law World’ (2000) 25 Yale Journal of International 
Law, 11-13), as codifiers could not foresee everything and in some cases did not even want to try to do so. 
46 See HP Glenn, ‘The Nationalist Heritage’ 84. 
47 Rousseau’s thinking has been of great influence here. See J Miller, Rousseau. Dreamer of Democracy (New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1984). A similar development as just described with regard to the process of 
codification in continental Europe could be witnessed in the common law through the evolution of the doctrine 
of stare decisis, which was only firmly rooted in the English legal system by the end of the nineteenth century. 
On this J Evans, 'Change in the Doctrine of Precedent during the Nineteenth Century' in L Goldstein (ed), 
Precedent in Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1987) 35-72. 
48 A comparative approach in any case sometimes seems to be more a matter of being en vogue, instead of really 
bringing useful insights to the issue being researched. MC Ponthoreau, ‘Le droit comparé en question(s). Entre 
pragmatisme et outil épistémologique’ (2005) 57 Revue internationale de droit compare 9. 
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communications, language, politics, etc.49 Comparative lawyers now also have to adapt their 
analytical and educational toolkits to other than constructivist purposes, and also to the 
realities of a largely fragmented and fluid regulatory landscape.50 Quite some challenges stand 
out, especially because a lot, if not most, of comparative law is still typically concerned with 
traditional legal questions: what is the law in at least two national jurisdictions and how do 
they compare in terms of similarities and differences? 
To avoid misunderstandings: the issue for comparative law is not so much whether or 
not the nation state will sooner or later fade away. We do not think it will, at least not in the 
foreseeable future. Let it also be clear that depending on the topic to be dealt with, it is to a 
greater or lesser extent still possible and sensible to engage in traditional multi-jurisdictional 
state-centred comparative law. So, too, will the long established purposes and aims of 
comparative law continue to be relevant for many years to come (including its constructivist 
purposes).51 Globalization is nevertheless challenging state-centred approaches to 
comparative law; globalization is a very complex and hybrid phenomenon, and law is no 
longer fully parochial, but usually also not fully cosmopolitan.52 But whatever it may be, in a 
globalizing world, comparative law, in order to avoid becoming too restricted in scope and 
becoming insufficient for new challenges53, should also self-consciously and explicitly 
encompass a dynamic approach to supplement its customary and more static perspective, to 
be able to answer questions such as: how do the societal changes that occur as a result of 
globalization impact on the configuration of legal traditions or culture; how do these adapt or 
maintain their distinctiveness; how is law used in relation to other legal cultures and 
traditions; how do new legal configurations become assimilated, rejected or refashioned in a 
host legal system, etc.?54 
                                                          
49 W. Twining, Globalisation and Legal Theory (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000) 4. 
50 P Zumbansen, ‘Transnational Comparisons: Theory and Practice of Comparative Law as a Critique of Global 
Governance’, in M Adams and JA Bomhoff (eds), Practice and Theory in Comparative Law 189-190. 
51 The European unification process is for example very much built on the traditional constructivist ambitions of 
comparative law. For a concise overview of the aims of comparative law, see G Dannemann, ‘Comparative Law: 
Study of Similarities or Differences?’ in M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 
Comparative Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006) 416. 
52 As Twining puts it: ‘it includes empires, spheres of influence, alliances, coalitions, religious diasporas, 
networks, trade routes, migration flows, and social movements. It also includes sub-worlds such as the common 
law world, the Arab world, the Islamic world and Christendom, as well as special groupings of power such as the 
G7, the G8, NATO, OPEC, the European Union, the Commonwealth, multi-national corporations, crime 
syndicates, cartels, social movements, and non-governmental organisations and networks. All of these cut across 
any simple vertical hierarchy and overlap and interact with each other in complex ways. These complexities are 
reflected in the diversity of forms of normative and legal ordering.’ W Twining, ‘Globalisation and Comparative 
Law’ in E Örücü and D Nelken (ed), Comparative Law. A Handbook 70. 
53 See also NHD Foster, ‘The Journal of Comparative Law: A New Scholarly Resource’ (2006) 1 Journal of 
Comparative Law 4. 
54 H Muir Watt, ‘Globalization and Comparative Law’, in M Reimann and R Zimmermann (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Law 589 (with further references). See, too, Demleitner, who states that in its 
‘classic’ form comparative law is restricted in scope and insufficient for the needs of the present situation, 
consisting mainly of an introduction to legal systems focusing on the common law/civil law divide, and the 
domestic systems of a few Western jurisdictions, such as France and Germany, together with comparisons 
between certain areas of private law (particularly obligations) in those systems.’ N Demleitner, ‘Combating 
Legal Ethnocentrism: Comparative Law Sets Boundaries’ (1999) 31 Arizona State Law Journal 737. This is 
what Twining calls the ‘Country and Western’ tradition of comparative law, contrasting especially between the 
‘parent’ civil and common law systems, and mostly dealing with private law. W Twining, Globalisation and 
Legal Theory 185ff. Similarly, Pihlajamäki, in this volume, argues for less focus by legal historians on the 
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These questions are prominently present in this volume, in the chapter by comparative 
legal historian Heikki Pihlajamäki for example.55 Comparison of law can be synchronic, but it 
can indeed just as well be diachronic. The latter is traditionally the hunting ground of the legal 
historian. Legal historians used to be national legal historians, but they are increasingly 
becoming comparative legal historians.56 Quite a few problems that confront comparative 
law, do also impact comparative legal history. In the latter’s case, an additional dimension can 
make the comparison more complicated. A legal historian can compare past legal cultures in 
the context of a common era, or he or she can work completely diachronically with a 
comparison of legal cultures in different eras. Paradoxically enough, this may actually make 
the comparison less complex if the situation at one place at one time corresponds better with 
that at another place at another time than with a contemporary. This lesson is one which many 
comparative lawyers have already, albeit unconsciously, taken to heart, as they delve into the 
goldmine of legal history. 
Pihlajamäki argues that national legal history is out. Leading legal historians see their 
discipline as European, and the next enlargement is already visible with pleas for a global 
legal history.57 No one can deny the attraction of a global legal history, but one may wonder 
whether the time has yet come for it. Legal historians are still trying to get a grip on regional 
and national legal histories58 and European legal history is still quite young as a discipline. 
Pihlajamäki pleads for a European legal history, but does not want to get rid of national (or 
regional) legal history. The latter is still valuable, but the researcher should be aware of the 
international context, since legal institutions move over borders. Moreover, even if no 
interaction with the outside world would exist, identifying similarities and differences 
between legal systems would still be helpful in finding explanations. In short, a national 
framework is not anathema, as long as the researcher places it within a European context. 
Pihlajamäki strongly suggests that we should not stop there and that we should also try to look 
for an even broader context, the global setting of European legal history, ie one that is not 
confined to nineteenth-century nationalism and positivism, but one that compares larger units 
to other larger units. Pihlajamäki stresses that comparative consciousness is for a legal 
historian necessary, because it helps the researcher to test hypotheses and prove or falsify 
them. He or she also needs to think comparatively at least as much in order to find out how 
legal influences, transfer, translations or transplants move from one legal order to another. 
Without a consciousness of legal transfers, one is, according to Pihlajamäki, completely at a 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
standard stories of European legal history (especially with a focus on Germany). An excellent and full-scale 
analysis of the relation between globalization and (national) law has recently been published by H Lindahl, Fault 
Lines of Globalization. Legal Order and the Politics of A-Legality (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2013). 
55 See also the chapter by Löhnig. 
56 Pihlajamäki being a case in point, as he is the articles editor of a new review Comparative Legal History (the 
name says it all), published by Hart. 
57 See T Duve, ‘Von der Europäischen Rechtsgeschichte zu einer Rechtsgeschichte Europas in globalhistorischer 
Perspektive’ (2012) 20 Rechtsgeschichte, 17. See also T Duve, ‘European Legal History - Global Perspectives. 
Working Paper for the Colloquium European Normativity - Global Historical Perspectives’, Max Planck 
Institute for European Legal History Research Paper Series, 2013-6 at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2292666. 
58 See, eg, the Oxford history of the laws of England. A majority of its volumes is still awaiting publication. 
General surveys of regional legal history, like K. Kroeschell, Recht unde Unrecht der Sassen. Rechtsgeschichte 
Niedersachsens (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2005) are still rare. 
12 
 
loss in attempting to explain changes in a particular legal system. This is not only true for 
peripheral legal systems, but for larger ones as well. 
In his chapter, Matthias Siems is precisely picking up this challenge, and builds on the 
legal transplants debate in order to revive it in a new direction. To date, this debate has been 
framed, on the one hand, in the language of the pessimists, who claim that legal transplants 
are at least disruptive to the incoming legal and socio-cultural system, and maybe even 
impossible. On the other hand, optimists acknowledge and support lawmakers in copying 
foreign rules, often admitting that in not all instances legal transplants work as smoothly as in 
the origin country. Siems analyzes a third type of reaction, namely, that legal transplants work 
even ‘better’ in the transplant country than in the original one. Borrowing from statistics, he 
calls these ‘overfitting legal transplants’. The success depends on the specifics of the case, 
and Siems can be credited for identifying some of these specifics (illustrated by examples). 
Let it be clear though, that the quest for overfitting legal transplants is not about finding quick 
‘silver bullets’, but about carefully understanding why domestic and foreign laws differ and 
how a subsequent legal transplant may affect an existing legal system. 
In his chapter on Ius commune, Alain Wijffels, just like Pihlajamäki a legal historian 
and comparative lawyer, addresses comparative lawyers by making clear in a few pages what 
it was and what it was not. We refer the reader to his article for clarification on that issue, but 
would like to emphasize here that the ius commune existed in a context of pluralism and, thus, 
of some comparison. In his chapter, he emphasizes that the Roman-canonistic ius commune 
tradition provided a theoretical and methodological pre-requirement for handling legal 
complexity, which included a diversity of both particular and common laws, including 
creating a comparative basis for those different systems; and also that, as a matrix and 
practical instrument of public governance developed in the Middle Ages, it retained a degree 
of the common foundations of public law and especially fair governance in diverging political 
systems during early-modern times. These are some lessons for the contemporary 
comparative lawyer, for example for those that are working in the context (or at the service 
of) of European unification: the history of ius commune indeed shows that basic values of a 
legal culture can be transmitted to an era where that legal culture has undergone a wholesale 
metamorphosis, under the condition that they are carried and defended by jurists who remain 
at the center of public governance: in the courts, but also at the heart of government. 
Sean Donlan, in his chapter, battles the use of concepts that fail to catch the normative 
reality within which legal norms function, and which has always been much broader than law 
proper. Thus, the Western idea of law as ‘state law’ is itself such a concept. By turning it into 
the standard, the researcher relegates non-Western or non-standard forms of normativity to a 
place in the shadows. However well intended his intentions may be, the researcher thus 
becomes guilty of conceptual colonization. Donlan stresses that state legality is actually just 
one type of legality, and legality itself only one form of normativity. There are no great 
‘Chinese Walls’ between them, and ‘there is no single legal norm’, Donlan states, that can be 
encapsulated ‘in a coherent and neatly hierarchical system’; the reality is too complex for that. 
Therefore, we need the language of hybridity to catch it. The comparative lawyer should not 
stick to a shallow concept of law, but go for capturing ‘a thicker image of normative legal 
hybridity’. To better illustrate this, Donlan delves into his own research on Louisiana and the 
complex hybrid there. Adding William Ewald’s ‘law in minds’ to the traditional distinction of 
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law in the books and law in action59, he also emphasizes the importance of research into the 
normative and legal hybridity of the practice and the consciousness of norms. Ultimately, 
normative and legal hybridity is part of a wider context, as the generation, application and 
interpretation of norms also receives external influences of politics, economics and ideologies. 
 
C. Context and Interdisciplinarity 
In line with all of this, comparative law requires a renewed research agenda, fitting, among 
other things, the type of questions identified in the previous paragraph (B). According to 
Örücü, the community of comparative lawyers has responded to the criticisms of the ‘old 
order’, which focused heavily on legal doctrine and black letter law, in four strands of 
research: comparative law and legal philosophy (comparative jurisprudence); comparative law 
and legal history (comparative legal history); comparative law and culture (comparative legal 
cultures); and comparative law and economics.60 
In this volume, the second and third strands Örücü identifies are prominent. It is these 
approaches that indeed might be able to signal the deeper cultural context of law and legal - or 
legally relevant - institutions. As Donlan writes in his chapter, ‘the insistence on context 
significantly problematizes the concept of closed and discrete systems of rules.’ A contextual 
approach however calls for resort to other disciplines than the law. The question then arises as 
to how much context is needed for answering the type of questions that were identified in the 
previous paragraph (B). Or to put it differently: are we looking for ‘law in context’ or for 
‘context in law’?61 Is it about using context to explain the form or content of law, or is it about 
revealing what the context itself is? 
The answer depends, we would say, on what one wants to know, on the aim(s) of the 
comparative research project in other words. In this sense context as such can refer to many 
different things: how a legal rule relates to other legal rules, or to its social, political, 
economic, religious etc. environment? But however vague it is or can be, there is nonetheless 
something more to say about this: it is possible to make a general and broad division between 
projects that implement a turn towards jurisprudence and those that look rather towards the 
social sciences or the study of culture. The first cherishes the merits of an internal perspective 
for comparison, designed to develop an understanding of foreign legal systems on their own 
terms.62 In many of its manifestations, this turn towards jurisprudence, or the elaboration of an 
                                                          
59 W Ewald, ‘Comparative Jurisprudence (I): What Was It Like to Try a Rat?’ (1994-1995) 143 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review 1889. 
60 E Örücü, ‘Critical Comparative Law: Considering Paradoxes for Legal Systems in Transition’ (June) 
Electronic Journal of Comparative Law at section 1.2 (http://www.ejcl.org/41/art41-1.html). See, too, NHD 
Foster, ‘The Journal of Comparative Law’ 5. 
61 D Nelken, ‘Comparative Law and Comparative Legal Studies’ in E Örücü and D Nelken (ed), Comparative 
Law. A Handbook 21. 
62 An approach used in the work of Mitchell Lasser and Catherine Valcke. See especially M. de S-O-l’E Lasser, 
Judicial Deliberations. A Comparative Analysis of Judicial Transparancy and Legitimacy (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 2004); See, eg, C Valcke, ‘The Different Rhetorics of the French and English Law of 
Contractual Interpretation’ in JW Neyers, R Bronaugh and SGA Pitel (eds), Exploring Contract Law (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2008), 77ff; C Valcke, ‘Convergence and Divergence among English, French, and German 
Conceptions of Contract’ (2008) 16 European Review of Private Law 29, and C Valcke, ‘Comparative History 
and the Internal View of French, German, and English Private Law’ (2006) 19 Canadian Journal of Law & 
Jurisprudence 133. See also JC Reitz, ‘How to Do Comparative Law’ (1998) 46 American Journal of 
Comparative Law, who somewhat exaggeratingly states that ‘the primary task for which comparative lawyers are 
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internal perspective on foreign law, relies heavily on insights drawn from hermeneutics and 
the humanities more generally.63 
However, it is when a shift is made, from efforts at understanding foreign law and 
legal institutions, to attempts at measuring or explaining the emergence, development or 
effect of foreign law (an external perspective), that an even greater engagement with other 
disciplines becomes necessary. What is at stake here, as David Nelken has pointed out, is the 
possible replacement or supplementation of legal, historical and philosophical scholarship 
with concepts and more empirical methods taken from the social sciences.64 And although 
contributions that clearly fall into this last category are not available in this volume, it is 
worthwhile to make the reader aware of what challenges this poses. To be sure, each of the 
aforementioned approaches has its challenges, opportunities and limitations. But the more 
extensive the input from the non-legal discipline (or the non-hermeneutic disciplines), the 
more potential problems there will be for the legal scholar, not just in integrating the different 
disciplines (the problems will be multiplied), but also in terms of ability: the researcher has to 
be knowledgeable in more than one discipline (being able to build on it), and possibly even 
able and versatile in doing non-legal research himself.65 
H. Patrick Glenn, in his chapter, indeed analyzes the phenomenon and development of 
comparative law as joint efforts with other sciences (philosophy of law, sociology and 
anthropology of law, law and economics). The recurrent theme is that comparison is always 
present, though its level and intensity may vary. The variation is itself actually a manifestation 
of a notion underlying all these comparisons: the objective pursued invariably determines the 
method and depth of the comparison. Consequently, there is, as Glenn notes too, no ‘one size 
fits all method’ of comparative law. This does not mean that ‘anything goes’, only that 
researchers can choose and tailor their methods of research to fit very different objectives. In 
fact, this has also allowed comparative law itself to constantly evolve with the times. In the 
early modern era, before the term comparative law even existed, it served to construct 
national legal systems.66 That task achieved, comparative law set itself to the taxonomy of 
new national legal systems. Once again, this was only a transient stage, as national legal 
systems moved from autonomy to interdependence. Glenn’s overview illustrates Samuel’s 
thesis that in order to know (comparative) law we have to know what it has been. To 
understand the changes of comparative law today, we have to also look at the changes 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
prepared by their training and experience is to compare law from the interior point of view (…).’ (628). See, too, 
M Adams and JA Bomhoff, ‘Comparing Law: Practice and Theory’ 9ff. 
63 In making clear what this amounts to, the work of HLA Hart is of course still of prime inspiration (which itself 
again builds on P Winch, The Idea of a Social Science (1958)). See especially HLA Hart, The Concept of Law 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1961) 97ff. One of the more constructive interpretations of this perspective is 
to be found in DN MacCormick’s Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1978) 
275ff, and his H.L.A. Hart (London, Edward Arnold, 1980) 36ff. See in the context of comparative law too: V 
Grosswald Curran, ‘Cultural Immersion. Differences and Categories in US Comparative Law’ (1998) 46 
American Journal of Comparative Law 43. 
64 D Nelken, ‘Comparative Law and Comparative Legal Studies’ 16. 
65 Realistically that might well require group work (see also Pihlajamäki in this volume, and D Heirbaut, ‘A tale 
of two legal histories’, in D Michalsen (ed), Reading Past Legal Texts (Oslo, Unipax, 2006) 91). For a helpful 
overview of dimensions of interdisciplinary legal research, see BMJ van Klink and HS Taekema, ‘On the 
Border. Limits and Possibilities of Interdisciplinary Research’, in BMJ van Klink and HS Taekema (eds), Law 
and Method. Interdisciplinary Research into Law (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2011) 7. 
66 A theme which is also prevalent in the chapter by Wijffels. 
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comparative law underwent in the past. 
As context is a crucial element of any meaningful comparative exercise, Roger 
Brownsword analyzes it through the angle of what he calls the regulatory environment. In a 
way, he is following up on Donlan’s plea for normative and legal hybridity. Brownsword 
makes us aware that, just as is the case with those who contest a state-centric concept of law, 
there is a debate going on amongst those specialized in regulation about how to understand 
‘law’. A regulator can use a normative register, eg by forbidding something, but he also has a 
non-normative register at his disposal. Using technological instruments, a regulator can ensure 
that the ‘regulatees’ no longer have the possibility of acting in an undesired way (think, for 
example, of an alcohol ignition interlock in a car; it eliminates the problem of drunk driving 
because the drunk can no longer drive). The wider moral issues this confronts us with are 
worthy of more research. For the comparative lawyer, the main lesson is that he should look 
at the regulatory environment in all its normative and non-normative manifestations and the 
place of a particular law within it. 
 As we noticed, ‘the’ context does not exist, or rather, it is impossible for the researcher 
to completely grasp the context in all of its riches and complexity. He can only try to get a 
handle on one or more of its aspects from the angle he chooses. Brownsword’s perspective 
promises to be highly rewarding for today’s societies. Others are valuable too. There is no 
single exclusive method for comparative law and neither is there a single, exclusive angle for 
grasping the complex realities of a legal system for the purposes of comparison, as the latter 
varies itself all the time. For John Bell, the institutional context is the soil in which legal rules 
are rooted, and which can particularly explain differences between legal systems. A 
researcher wanting to understand and not just describe legal rules has to study the institutions 
that formulate, interpret and apply them. Bell pays particular attention to the organisations, 
procedures, personnel and ethos that play a part in the operation of the law. As legal 
institutions are not free from the influence and pressure of non-legal, eg political institutions, 
the latter also belongs to the institutional context. Bell broadens the context to be studied 
considerably. However, he also offers a way to narrow it down again. Institutions, their actors 
and their relationships change over time. Consequently, the institutional context is one of 
evolution. This means that the professions behind them, in particular the legal professions, 
have to be a prime subject of research. 
 Context and institutions are also central to Jørn Øyrehagen Sunde’s ideas on legal 
culture. Legal culture has an intellectual element, ie ideas and expectations shaping law, 
which is made operational by its institutional element (institutions for conflict settlement and 
norm production). Making a legal-cultural analysis is no longer obligatory only for scholars, 
as the internationalization that law brings has given law a new dimension and every practicing 
lawyer has to cope with it. Øyrehagen Sunde illustrates this with examples from his homeland 
Norway. If Norwegian lawyers have to deal with law produced outside their borders, they 
need, not just a knowledge of the outside legal cultural context, but also of their own because 
sometimes different countries have to apply law in the same way. This means that every 
country has to de- and re-code it so that this will happen. Thus, paradoxically, even when the 
goal is the element of the inside legal cultural context, a thorough understanding of the latter 
in comparison to the outside element is still necessary. Norway is not a member of the 
European Union, yet the dominating outsider in many cases is the European Union. To 
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Øyrehagen Sunde, its influence is even more pervasive than that of the European Court on 
Human Rights. 
If, in Norwegian law, the EU has become a major player, it is hard to overestimate its 
impact on the legal systems of the EU member states. Currency crises, austerity measures and 
a political backlash against the EU, as described by Joxerramon Bengoetxea, have led to some 
soul searching. In Europe, the time of the old nation-state as the great forum has passed. 
Europeans need to find a new identity, and the challenge is to accommodate the pluralism of 
regional identities within Europe and remain open to the cosmopolitan legal order. 
Bengoetxea does not yet present us with an answer as to what exactly the comparative lawyer 
may contribute. Nevertheless, it should be clear that the old way of just working on unifying 
the legal systems of Europe is not enough. 
If European lawyers are willing to accept a global framework, this will also make it 
possible for others to help them. Luke Nottage and Souichirou Kozuka, scholars from 
Australia and Japan respectively, have analysed the politics of recent contract law reform in 
Japan. As they have indicated, there are parallels with contract law reforms in France and 
Germany, or the Common European Sales Law in the EU. Going global may mean a heavier 
burden for the European comparatist, but also more hands to reduce that workload. The 
specific micro-politics of contract law reform in Japan are fascinating in themselves. Building 
on Sacco’s legal formants, Nottage and Kozuka analyse the power play amongst various 
interest groups and individuals within them, which ultimately determines the success of the 
reform and its content. Their analysis is not just a variant of Sacco’s analysis, but also an 
application of Bell’s institutional approach, as propagated in this volume. The dominating 
players in the Japanese legal world are the judges of the Supreme Court and the Ministry of 
Justice. The law professors are only the sidekicks of this bureaucratic coalition, if only 
because professors are bound to disagree somewhat amongst themselves. On the other hand, if 
law professors can present a ‘global standard’ this is not without some influence. In this sense, 
the human fallacy of a thirst for recognition also haunts Japanese law scholars. Some foreign 
and international rules did make it into the reform, even though their practical application in 
Japan remains doubtful. Nonetheless, at least the academics championing them scored.67 
Toon Moonen reminds us that, at least in the Western world, the context of 
comparative law is democracy and the rule of law. If, however, majority view (and 
accompanying decision making) and fundamental human rights protection clash, 
constitutional courts face the challenge of legitimating their constitutional review. 
Methodology in this case is not just a scholar’s tool; it is also useful for convincing legal 
professionals, and the society at large, of the reasonableness of their decisions. Given the 
important role of supranational courts, comparative law even has a prominent role to play. On 
the one hand, these courts have to keep in mind a diversity of national audiences, but on the 
other hand national constitutional courts have to strive for acceptance of their decisions at a 
national, but also at a transnational level. Due to the international dimension, the deliberative 
approach Moonen pleads for, confronts the judges with an enormous challenge. After all, ‘the 
                                                          
67 Like Nottage and Kozuka, Alain Wijffels wants scholars to appraise conflicting interests in an analysis of legal 
formants. He also reminds us that an analytical framework is already available, the Interessenjurisprudenz. In 
applying it, the scholar should distinguish between the comparisons the scholars and practitioners which one 
studies, apply, and one’s own methods to assess their achievements. 
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responsibility of the judge goes as far that it is her duty to consider if all democratically 
rational approaches and solutions are on the court’s discussion table, especially if for some 
reason they were not (adequately) represented in court, and even if she feels not particularly 
attracted to it.’ Consequently, the judge has to be a comparatist, who does not just look at the 
debates in his or her own country, but also those outside it. He or she has to be capable of 
decoding their legal-cultural context, but also of encoding his own decisions for an optimal 
communication to national and foreign audiences. 
Finally, Susan Millns in her chapter notices a lack of consensus as to the aims and 
methods for effective comparative law. But whatever aim is pursued by it, she firmly 
concludes that without any consideration for the contexts in which the law is applied (with 
particular attention for legal cultures and traditions, and for charting differences), comparison 
cannot sensibly be carried out. Just like many others in this volume, she thinks that textual 
analysis of legal norms is insufficient to explain for differences between legal cultures. After 
identifying some difficulties the European public lawyer might face, she proceeds by making 
a case for more comparative law in the realm of public law, thus setting out a research agenda. 
One of the key questions for research in European comparative public law is the extent to 
which fundamental rights, in the light of technological and scientific progress and of potential 
assaults upon both physical and mental integrity, are protected in equal measure across 
Europe; and what can explain differences between jurisdictions as far as this is concerned. 
 
 
IV. Rounding Up 
 
If comparative law does not want to fade away into oblivion, we have to rethink its role as a 
scholarly discipline. In an increasingly interdependent era that makes ever-greater demands 
on our ability to understand the (legal) world with which we are confronted, comparative law 
can be of tangible benefit and a centrepiece of legal education and research. All this of course 
makes the task of comparative law even more complex than it already was: integrating new 
challenges into the comparative discipline raises questions of feasibility and practicality, of 
what still should/can be national in legal education, of how much non-law should be part of 
the curriculum, of making lawyers sensitive of the non-orderly world of borders and non-
borders, etc. The challenges are formidable indeed, but they cannot be ignored. The chapters 
in this volume are witness to this challenge. 
Having said all this, the many contributions to this volume, and especially the sheer 
diversity they collectively represent, also reveal a feature of comparative law that according to 
us we have to continue to cherish: comparative law is about much more than generating truth 
claims, about suggesting solutions to specific problems, about the efficiency of norms, about 
practical applications, etc. It is all these things, but it is in the end also about bringing 
‘something to light’ (as Heidegger would have it): an activity that is specialized in 
imagination, because in all its diversity it reveals many different valuable ways of looking at 
the law and its role in society; a way of possibly understanding at least a little bit of the 
multiple reality the law represents. 
In line with this, one final question may be on the lips of many readers of this book: is 
all this attention for methodological issues, especially in the context of comparative law, 
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really necessary? Can a comparatist not just go ahead without letting these issues drag him or 
her down? Is comparative law, at least from a quotidian perspective, not something 
researchers simply do, whenever they look at foreign legal systems to answer one or more of a 
range of questions about law, whether these questions are doctrinal, economic, sociological, 
etc. And is, after all, in the race for EU funding, comparative law’s place not quite humble? 
As far as the last question is concerned: according to Rob van Gestel and Hans 
Micklitz, in their chapter, comparative law increasingly serves to just legitimize preordained 
reform plans. Scholarly research is then an instrument that should be concerned with serving 
its economic and political masters and take into the bargain that this does not always allow for 
a well-elaborated methodology. Both authors are not in se against ‘bridging the gap between 
research and the market’. They do however deplore that in many cases this degrades into 
‘advocacy scholarship’, which first and foremost wants to defend the contractor’s interest and 
entails only the thinnest veneer of methodology. 
As gatekeepers of our profession, this should concern us all. Eventually ‘an ongoing 
instrumentalisation of comparative legal research can easily undermine the public trust in 
legal scholars in general and comparative lawyers in particular’, Van Gestel and Micklitz 
write. Therefore, it is our duty to instill in aspiring lawyers a sense of the authentic 
imagination comparative law can stimulate. But for that we more or less need a sense of what 
we are doing when we ‘do’ comparative law, and this is first and foremost an epistemological 
and methodological endeavor. This book is essentially about this endeavor and hopes to 
contribute a small part to that, thus honoring a scholar who has inspired us all to put 
comparative law at the heart of our research. 
